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Introduction
In recent experimental studies, uncertainty about other players' actions has been found to be a clear driver of behavior, see e.g. Heinemann et al. (2009) and Cabrales et al. (2010) . Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Brandenburger (1996) , one usually alludes to this type of uncertainty as 'strategic uncertainty', as opposed to uncertainty regarding the underlying structure of the game played, which is sometimes called 'structural uncertainty' (see e.g. Morris and Shin, 2002) . Strategic uncertainty matters because in a wide range of games, many of the equilibria represent fragile situations in which players are supposed to choose a particular strategy, even though this would be optimal only if they held knife-edge beliefs about the actions taken by other players. In such situations, even the slightest uncertainty about other players' choices might lead a player to deviate from his or her equilibrium strategy. This uncertainty problem is aggravated in games with multiple Nash equilibria, and it may get particularly serious when there is a whole continuum of equilibria.
That said, in the laboratory, human subjects' behavior in games with multiple equilibria has also been found to be fairly stable and predictable in the aggregate. For instance, Abbink and Brandts (2008) produce an experimental study of Bertrand competition under strictly convex costs. Dastidar (1995) had shown that those oligopoly games admit a whole continuum of Nash equilibria, but they find that an attractor of play is the zero-monopoly-profit price. In experimental treatments with more than two firms in the market, that price is actually the modal outcome in their data. Abbink and Brandts (2008) remark that "[that] price level (...) is not predicted by any benchmark theory [they] are aware of" (p. 3). 1 We conjecture that part of this regularity may be that some equilibria are perceived as less strategically risky than others. In this paper, we introduce, and study in some generality, a robustness criterion for games with continuum strategy sets. We then proceed to show that our robustness criterion selects a unique equilibrium in the game of Bertrand competition with convex costs, and that this selection agrees with Abbink's and Brandts ' (2008) empirical findings.
To be more specific about our contribution, we here formalize a notion of strategic uncertainty and propose a criterion for robustness to such uncertainty. We focus on games with continuum action spaces, with measurable and bounded, but not necessarily continuous payoff functions. Our approach is, roughly, as follows. A player's uncertainty about others' strategy choices is represented by a player-specific, atomless probability distribution, scaled with a parameter t ≥ 0, over others' strategy sets. We do not exclude the possibility that these beliefs may be biased or that two players have inter-personally inconsistent beliefs about a third one. For each value of the uncertainty parameter t, we define a t-equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of the game in which each player strives to maximize her expected payoff under her strategic uncertainty so defined. For t = 0, this is nothing else than Nash equilibrium in the original game. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if there exists a collection of probability distributions in the admitted class, one for each player, such that some accompanying sequence of t-equilibria converges to this profile as the uncertainty parameter t tends to zero. If convergence holds for all distributions in the admitted class, we say that the strategy profile is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty (in this class).
We apply this definition to Bertrand competition and show that the unique, corresponding prediction in the case of strictly convex costs agrees with the findings in Abbink and Brandts (2008) . Heuristically, strategic uncertainty in such discontinuous games results in uncertainty-perturbed profit functions that are continuous. The deviation incentives in some Nash equilibria may be quite asymmetric, though. At high Nash equilibrium prices, a strategically uncertain player has an incentive to slightly undercut, since she has much more to lose if others cut their prices than if they raised their prices. Conversely, for low Nash equilibrium prices, an uncertain player has an incentive to raise her price slightly, since she has a lot to loose if others raised their prices and little to lose if they cut their prices. The only Nash equilibrium price that is robust to strategic uncertainty is the price at which a monopolist would earn zero profit. In fact, that price is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty.
The proposed framework is well-suited to study games with discontinuous payoff functions, which are not uncommon in economics. However, our approach applies to a wide class of games. For games with continuous payoff functions, we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, and we show that under standard (compactness and convexity) assumptions, robust equilibria exist. We also show that our definition coincides with that of Nash equilibrium in very well-behaved games, more specifically, in all games with continuously differentiable payoff functions on compact and convex strategy spaces, where each payoff function is strictly concave in the player's own strategy. We also show that, for two-player games, it implies weak perfection in the sense of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides definitions and section 3 applies them to Bertrand competition. In section 4 general results are presented for games with continuous payoff functions and in section 5 our notion of robustness is extended to higher dimensional strategy sets. Section 6 discusses related literature and section 7 concludes. Mathematical proofs are given in an appendix. 
Robustness to strategic uncertainty
In this section, we introduce our definition of robustness to strategic uncertainty. Let G = (N, S, π) be an n-player normal-form game in which the strategy set of each player i ∈ N = {1, ..., n} is S i = R. Thus, S = R n is the set of strategy profiles, s = (s 1 , ..., s n ), and π : S → R n is the combined payoff function, with π i (s) being the payoff to player i when s is played. 2 We assume each payoff function π i to be Borel measurable and bounded but do not require continuity. Let F be the set of continuous and everywhere positive probability density functions on R. For φ ∈ F and any x ∈ R, let Φ (x) = R x −∞ φ (x) dx. This defines the associated cumulative probability distribution on R with Φ 0 = φ. Definition 1. For any given t ∈ [0, 1], a strategy profile s is a t-equilibrium of G if, for each player i, the strategy s i maximizes i's expected payoff under the probabilistic belief that all other players' strategies are random variables of the form
for some statistically independent "noise" terms ε ij with densities φ ij ∈ F for all j 6 = i.
Remark 1. For t = 0, this definition coincides with that of Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2. For t > 0, each random variables ij has a probability density f
Note that we do not require that noise terms be symmetric or have expectation zero. Hence, in a t-equilibrium it may well be that some players believe that others tend more to deviate upwards than downwards.
Lets −i denote the (n − 1)-vector of random variables (s ij ) j6 =i . We note that any t-equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff functions: Remark 3. Let t > 0 and φ ij ∈ F for all i ∈ N and j 6 = i. A strategy profile s ∈ S is a t-equilibrium of G = (N, S, π), with ε ij ∼ φ ij , if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game G t = (N, S, π t ), where
This defines a probability density fors ij with support S j . Taking expectations with respect to such probability densities f t ij , one obtains a perturbed game with payoff functions
We note that Y i (t, s −i ) > 0 for all t > 0 and that
Some comments are in place. First, we do not require that all players i 6 = j hold the same belief about a particular player j. Second, in our definition of t-equilibrium we assume statistical independence of noise terms. This is done for convenience only. Statistical dependence among the noise terms would not change our results as long as the joint distribution across other players' strategy sets has a density. (In two-player games, the issue is of course moot.) Third, as seen in (1), we assume that players' probabilistic beliefs have an additive structure. Alternatively, one could work with more general random variables representing players' subjective beliefs. However, the present formulation turns out to be rich enough to generate interesting results, and it easy to apply, as we now proceed to show. 
Bertrand competition
We now turn to an application of our definition of robustness to strategic uncertainty to Bertrand competition. Following Vives (1999, p.117), we take Bertrand competition to mean that (a) sellers simultaneously post their prices and (b) each firm is committed to serve all its clients at its posted price. In particular, it cannot ration its demand. As mentioned by Vives (1999) , for certain utilities and auctions, provision is legally mandated and in other markets firms have a strong incentive to serve all their clients, especially in industries in which customers have an on-going relationship with suppliers (subscription, repeat purchases, etc.) or where the costs of restricting output in real time are high. 3 Our definition of robustness selects a unique Nash equilibrium out of a continuum of pure-strategy equilibria in a class of Bertrand competition games with convex costs. However, before embarking on that analysis, we briefly consider the canonical Bertrand competition game with linear costs. Example 1. Consider two identical firms, each with constant unit cost c > 0, in a simultaneous-move pricing game à la Bertrand in a market for a homogeneous good. Let the demand function be linear, D (p) = a − p, for all p ∈ [0, a] with a > c. 4 Then, the monopoly profit function, Π (p) = (a − p)(p − c), is strictly concave with a unique maximum at p m = (a + c) /2 < a and Π (p m ) > 0. By contrast, the unique duopoly Nash equilibrium, p 1 = p 2 = c, results in zero profits. This Nash equilibrium is weakly dominated. Nevertheless, it is robust to strategic uncertainty. For sufficiently small degrees of strategic uncertainty, both firms will set their prices a little bit above marginal cost, and less so, the less uncertain they are. To see this, suppose that ε ij ∼ φ ∈ F.
5 For each t > 0 and all p 1 , p 2 ∈ [0, a], and with Φ denoting the c.d.f. induced by φ:
This profit can be rewritten as
where the first factor is positive and independent of p i . A necessary first-order condition for symmetric t-equilibrium 6 is thus that
Consequently, in the perturbed game, it is never optimal to choose p i ≤ c or p i ≥ p m . On the interval (c, p m ), the left-hand side is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of p i , that runs from plus infinity to zero, while the right-hand side is a constant. Hence, there exists a unique symmetric t-equilibrium price, p t , for every t > 0. As t → 0, the denominator of the right-hand side tends to Φ (1) − Φ (0) > 0. Thus, the left-hand side has to tend to zero for (4) to hold. Consequently, p t ↓ c. This observation can be generalized from duopoly to oligopoly, with an arbitrary number n > 1 of firms. It is easily verified that the necessary first-order condition (4) then will have an extra factor (n − 1) on its right-hand side. This does not affect the limit result p t ↓ c but for positive t, the t-equilibrium price p t will be lower the more firms there are in the industry. Now, consider n ≥ 2 identical firms i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n} in a market for a homogeneous good. Aggregate demand D :
All firms i simultaneously set their prices p i ∈ R + . Let p = (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n ) be the resulting strategy profile (or price vector). The minimal price, p 0 := min {p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n }, will be called the (going) market price. Let m be the number of firms that quote the going market price, m := | {i :
All firms have the same strictly convex cost function, C : R + −→ R + , which is twice differentiable with C(0) = 0 and C 0 , C 00 > 0. Each firm is required to serve all demand addressed to it at its posted price. The profit to each firm i is thus
This defines a simultaneous-move n-player game G in which each player i has pure-strategy set R + and payoff function π i : R n + → R, defined in equation (5) . A strategy profile p will be called symmetric if p 1 = ... = p n , and we will call a price p ∈ R + a symmetric Nash equilibrium price if p = (p, p, ..., p) is a Nash equilibrium of G. For each positive integer m ≤ n and non-negative price p, let
This defines a finite collection of twice differentiable functions, hv m i m∈{1,2,..,n} , where v m (p) is the profit to each of m firms if they all quote the same price p and all other firms post higher prices (so that p is the going market price). In particular, v 1 defines the profit to a monopolist as a function of its price p.
We impose one more condition on C and D, namely, that the associated monopoly profit function, v 1 , is concave. More exactly, we assume that v 00
Since the cost function is strictly convex by assumption, this concavity assumption on v 1 effectively requires the demand function to be "not too convex". We have v 1 (p mon ) ≥ 0. By convexity of the cost function, there exists prices p ∈ (0, p max ) at which all n firms, when quoting the same price p, make positive profits, and v n (p) > 0.
The game G has a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria. 7 For any number of firms, n ≥ 2, letp n ∈ (0, p max ) be the price p at which v n (p) = 0 and letp n ∈ (0, p max ) be the price p at which v n (p) = v 1 (p). Dastidar (1995, Lemmas 1, 5 and 6) shows existence and uniqueness ofp n andp n , and thatp n <p n . 8 All prices in the interval P NE n = [p n ,p n ] are symmetric Nash equilibrium prices in the game G, and no price outside this interval is a symmetric Nash equilibrium price (Dastidar, 1995 , Proposition 1). There exists a unique pricep at which a monopolist makes zero profit, v 1 (p) = 0, and, moreover,p ∈ (p n ,p n ) (Dastidar, 1995, Lemmas 4 and 6). Bothp n andp n are strictly decreasing in n (Dastidar, 1995, Lemma 7). In the present setting, it is easily verified thatp n ↓ 0 andp n ↓p, and hence P We proceed to apply our robustness definition to this class of discontinuous games. Let t > 0 and suppose that a firm i holds a probabilistic belief of form (1) about other firms' prices, with Φ ij denoting the c.d.f. induced by each probability density φ ij ∈ F. For any price p i that firm i might contemplate to set, its subjective probability that any other firm will choose exactly the same price is zero. Hence, with probability one, its own price will either lie above the going market price or it will be the going market price and all other firms' prices will be higher, so i will then be a monopolist at its price p i . Each firm i's payoff function in the perturbed game G t = (N, S, π t ) is, for any t > 0, defined by
The second factor is due to the restriction of the support of subjective beliefs about others' prices to R + . This factor being positive and independent of p i , a price profile p is a Nash equilibrium of G t if and only if
where
. For any t > 0, a price profile p is a t-equilibrium in the pricing game G if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the gameḠ t . Let F * ⊂ F be the class of log-concave probability distributions with finite mean. More exactly, by log-concavity we mean continuously differentiable probability density functions φ such that ln φ is a concave function. The log-concavity assumption is common in the economics literature and has applications in mechanism design, game theory and labor economics, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) . A useful feature of those distributions is that they have non-decreasing hazard rates; that is, the hazard rate
is non-decreasing (see Corollary 2 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). Examples of log-concave distributions are the normal, exponential and Gumbel distributions.
In the subsequent analysis we will require all density functions φ to belong to the subset F * . Strategy profiles that are robust to uncertainty represented by such density functions will be said to be robust to strategic uncertainty in F * . The next proposition uses the log-concavity of the density functions in F * to show that each player's best-reply correspondence is convex-valued. We then use Kakutani's fixed point theorem to show existence of a t-equilibrium. Proposition 1. Let t > 0 and assume that φ ij ∈ F * ∀i ∈ N, j 6 = i. ThenḠ t has at least one Nash equilibrium. Moreover, any such Nash equilibrium p t is interior.
The following proposition uses the monotonicity of the hazard rates, which follows from our log-concavity assumption, to show symmetry of any robust equilibrium. It then follows that a t-equilibrium price, which has to lie abovep, has to lie close top.
Proposition 2. The Nash equilibrium (p, ...,p) is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty in F * . No other strategy profile of G is robust to strategic uncertainty in F * .
Example 3. Consider again the duopoly in Example 2. We then havep = 1/6 ≈ 0.167. Suppose that both firms' uncertainty takes the form of normally distributed noise, ε 1 , ε 2 ∼ N (0, 1). The necessary first-order condition for interior t-equilibrium then consists of the equations
The diagram below shows these best-reply curves (dashed for player 2), for t = 0.1, withp marked by thin straight lines. 
Experimental evidence.
We end this section with a short account of the experimental evidence for this class of games. In Abbink's and Brandts' (2008) experiment, the price interval was [1, 40] and they conducted sessions with n = 2, 3 and 4 firms in a finitely repeated market interaction with fixed matching, see diagram below (their Figure 3) . The associated ranges of Nash equilibrium prices were P = [3, 27] , respectively, withp = 24 in all three cases. The diagrams show a strong tendency to this latter price. 9 Argenton and
12
Müller (2009) replicated the experiment in Abbink and Brandts for n = 2, but with other cost and demand parameters. In their setting,p = 32, and they also found that it was an attractor of play.
Figure 4. Empirical frequencies of prices in Abbink and Brandts (2008).
4. Continuous games A clear feature of Bertrand games with homogenous products is the discontinuity of payoffs. We now turn attention to games with continuous payoff functions to examine when our robustness criterion has some bite and how it relates to existing solution concepts. We first show that in such games, robustness to strategic uncertainty is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. Heuristically, if a strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium in the original game, then some player has a strictly better reply to it. Such a player will then also have a strictly better reply in any slightly perturbed game, since the perturbed payoff function will be close to the original one. Formally: Proposition 3. If the payoff functions in G are continuous and s * is robust to strategic uncertainty, then s * is a Nash equilibrium.
It is not difficult to verify existence of strategy profiles that are robust to strategic uncertainty in games with continuous payoff functions, if each strategy set is compact and convex and each payoff function π i is concave in s i (for every s −i ): Proposition 4. Suppose that the payoff functions in G are continuous, that the strategy sets are compact and convex, and that each payoff function π i is concave in s i (for every s −i ). Let φ ij ∈ F, ∀i ∈ N, j 6 = i. For each t > 0, the perturbed game G t has at least one Nash equilibrium, and G has at least one strategy profile that is robust to strategic uncertainty.
It follows from Proposition 3 and the proof of Proposition 4 that if a game with continuous and concave payoff functions over compact and convex strategy sets has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is not only robust to strategic uncertainty, but is in fact strictly robust: Corollary 1. Suppose that the payoff functions in G are continuous, that the strategy sets are compact and convex, and that each payoff function π i is concave in s i (for every s −i ). If s * is the unique Nash equilibrium of G, then s * is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty.
The following example shows that even games that satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 4 may have strict equilibria that are not robust to strategic uncertainty. Any symmetric strategy profile (s, s) is a strict equilibrium. Yet, only (0, 0) is robust 14 to strategic uncertainty. Indeed, for any density φ 12 ∈ F and strategy s 2 ∈ (0, 1], the derivative of π t 1 with respect to s 1 equals
where Y 1 (t, s 2 ) = Φ 12 ((1 − s 2 ) /t) − Φ 12 (−s 2 /t) > 0 and → 1 as t → 0. For s 1 ≥ s 2 > 0 and for all t > 0 sufficiently small, the expression in (8) is negative. Hence, for small t > 0, any best reply s 1 for player 1 lies below s 2 whenever s 2 > 0. For small t, only (0, 0) is a t-equilibrium. As the density φ 12 was arbitrary, only (0, 0) is robust to strategic uncertainty. (Indeed, it is strictly robust.)
Finally, we note that robustness to strategic uncertainty does not exclude all weakly dominated strategies in all continuous games. Indeed, as noted by Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) , admissibility is not a property that one can generally expect from Nash equilibrium refinements in continuum-action games. 
and π 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) ≡ π 1 (s 2 , s 1 ). This game has a unique Nash equilibrium, (0, 0), but for each player i, the strategy s i = 0 is weakly dominated by all other strategies. Nevertheless, this is a game that meets the conditions in Corollary 1, and hence the weakly dominated Nash equilibrium (0, 0) is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty. 4.1. Continuously differentiable games. Some of the above examples had continuous, but not differentiable, payoff functions. The following example shows that our robustness criterion has cutting power also in games with continuously differentiable payoff functions. The payoff functions in question are concave in the player's own strategy, and the game has a continuum of Nash equilibria only one of which is robust to strategic uncertainty. 
All strategy profiles in which s 2 = 1 are Nash equilibria. However, only one of these, (1, 1) , is undominated. It is easily verified that the latter is the unique robust equilibrium. Moreover, it is strictly robust.
However, in games where each player's payoff function is also strictly concave in the player's own strategy, all three concepts -robustness, strict robustness and Nash equilibrium -coincide. By definition, strict robustness implies robustness, and, in force of Proposition 3, robustness implies Nash equilibrium in this class of games. Hence, the point to be proved here is that every Nash equilibrium in these games is strictly robust. This follows from the observation that since the relevant partial derivatives of the payoff functions in the original game are continuous, and the strategy sets are compact, the corresponding partial derivatives in a slightly perturbed game are "close" to those in the original game. Payoff functions being strictly concave, the partial derivative is non-zero to a player who unilaterally deviates from a Nash equilibrium in the original game. Hence, this is also true in the perturbed game. Formally:
Proposition 5. Suppose that the payoff functions in G are continuously differentiable, that the strategy sets are compact and convex, and that each payoff function π i is strictly concave in s i (for every s −i ). Then the following three statements are equivalent: A strategy profile is strictly robust to uncertainty, it is robust to strategic uncertainty, and it is a Nash equilibrium, respectively.
We note that all hypotheses, except for differentiability, are met by the game in Example 4, and, as we showed, infinitely many of the (strict) Nash equilibria are non-robust to strategic uncertainty. Hence, the result is almost sharp (the missing link being games with payoff functions that are differentiable but not continuously differentiable).
Weak perfection.
We proceed to relate our robustness criteria to the notion of weak perfection in Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) . For each player i ∈ N, let S i = [a i , b i ] for a i < b i , and let ∆ i denote the set of Borel probability measures over S i . For any μ ∈ ¤ = × i∈N ∆ i , let β i (μ) ∈ ∆ i denote i's set of mixed best replies to the mixed-strategy profile μ. Following Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) , define the weak-metric distance between two mixed strategies, μ i and υ i , as follows:
where B δ is the δ-neighborhood of B. Identify pure strategies with unit point masses.
Definition 3 [Simon and Stinchcombe, 1995] . For any ε > 0, a weak perfect ε-equilibrium is a completely mixed-strategy profile, μ ε ∈ int(¤), such that, for every player i ∈ N, ρ w i (μ ε i , β i (μ ε )) < ε. A strategy profile μ * ∈ ¤ is weakly perfect if it is the limit as ε k → 0 of a sequence of weak perfect ε k -equilibria.
While our notion of robustness to strategic uncertainty allows two players to differ in their beliefs about a third player, such interpersonal inconsistency is, by construction, excluded by Simon and Stinchcombe, who work with mixed strategy profiles rather than with subjective beliefs. In order to establish a tight connection between their approach and ours, we call a collection of beliefs © φ ij ∈ F : i ∈ N, j 6 = i ª interpersonally consistent if, for each player j ∈ N, φ 1j = ... = φ nj . In other words, all players i 6 = j share beliefs about j's strategy choice. We proceed to show that in games with continuous payoff functions and convex and compact strategy sets, robustness to interpersonally consistent strategic uncertainty implies weak perfection. 10 The reason why interpersonal consistency matters is that a shared subjective probability distribution concerning a player's strategy choice can be viewed as a mixed strategy for that player.
Proposition 6. If the payoff functions in G are continuous and the strategy sets convex and compact, then every strategy profile that is robust to interpersonally consistent strategic uncertainty is weakly perfect.
Needless to say, strict robustness to strategic uncertainty requires, inter alia, robustness to interpersonally consistent belief systems. Hence, a strategy profile that is strictly robust is also weakly perfect. In the two-player case, only one player holds a belief about a given player, so the issue of interpersonal consistency of beliefs does not arise. Thus, in such games, robustness to strategic uncertainty implies weak perfection.
The next example shows that for the Bertrand competition game in Example 3, weak perfection in the sense of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) admits Nash equilibria that are non-robust to strategic uncertainty: Example 7. Reconsider Example 3 and let the pure-strategy set for each firm be [0, 1]. The set of Nash equilibrium prices is the sub-interval [1/11, 3/13] and we havē p = 1/6. Let μ ε i , for i = 1, 2 and ε ∈ (0, 1), be a completely mixed strategy that consists of a positive uniform density on the full price interval [0, 1], with total mass ε 2 ∈ (0, 1), and a point mass on a candidate equilibrium price p * ∈ (1/11, 1/6) with probability mass 1−ε 2 . We know from Proposition 2 that this Nash equilibrium price is not robust to strategic uncertainty. However, it is weakly perfect. To see this, note that the set of i's pure best replies to the completely mixed strategy μ ε j (for j 6 = i) is
A price p <p such that p 6 = p * is clearly not a best reply, since the expected profit is negative. The remaining candidates for best replies are p = p * or p ≥p, so
As ε → 0, the expected profit converges to zero for each p ≥p and to v 2 (p) > 0 for p = p * . Hence, for all ε > 0 sufficiently small, p = p * is the unique best reply. It follows that μ ε = (μ
5. Multi-dimensional strategy sets Our criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty is readily generalized from onedimensional to multi-dimensional strategy sets. We here briefly outline a finitedimensional generalization.
11 Let again G = (N, S, π) be an n-player normal-form game with player set N = {1, ..., n}, set S = × i∈N S i of strategy profiles s = (s 1 , ..., s n ), and combined payoff function π : S → R n , with π i (s) being the payoff to player i when strategy profile s is played. 12 Let the strategy set of each player i be a Borel set S i , with non-empty interior, in a Euclidean space R m i , for some positive integer m i . Accordingly, S is a Borel set in R m , where m = m 1 + ... + m n . We assume each payoff function π i to be Borel measurable and bounded. This is a large class of games. It includes all dynamic games of incomplete information with finite type spaces, a finite number of information sets and finite choice sets at non-final information sets, allowing for infinite Euclidean choice sets at final information sets.
For each positive integer k, let F k be the set of continuous and everywhere positive probability density functions on R k . For φ ∈ F k and any Borel set
This defines a positive Borel measure on R k . Just as in the one-dimensional case, such density functions, adapted to the strategy set of a player, will represent other players' (subjective) beliefs about the strategy choice of that player. In particular, for two players i and j, and for any φ ij ∈ F m j , let μ ij (B) = R B φ ij (x) dx be the Borel probability measure on the Euclidean space R m j that contains j's strategy set, S j .
Definition 4. For any given scalar t ∈ [0, 1], a strategy profile s is a t-equilibrium of G if, for each player i, the strategy s i maximizes i's expected payoff under the view our approach as a framework within which researchers may introduce additional hypotheses about the source(s) of strategic uncertainty and thereby constrain the subjective beliefs. 13 Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) and Méndez-Naya et al. (1995) study perfection and related ideas in games with compact and convex strategy sets, and continuous payoff functions. Our main application is to a game with discontinuous payoff functions. Carlsson and Ganslandt (1998) investigate "noisy equilibrium selection" in symmetric coordination games and derive results that agree with the experimental findings on minimal effort games in Van Huyck et al. (1990) . While Carlsson's and Ganslandt's (1998) study is tailored to such games, our approach permits analysis of robustness to strategic uncertainty for a large class of games.
Although quantal response equilibrium (QRE), pioneered by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), was initially developed for finite games, Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) extend it to infinite-action games. The QRE approach assumes probabilistic choice, driven either by idiosyncratic perturbations of individual players' preferences (here profit functions) or by mistakes in their implementation of strategies. The choice probabilities are increasing functions of the expected payoffs. A QRE requires consistency in the sense that each player's probability distribution follows from its presumed functional form as applied to the expected payoffs from others' probabilistic choices. In particular, players do not best respond to their information or beliefs about each other, which occurs only in the limit as the noise level is driven down to zero. Baye and Morgan (2004) apply the continuum-action QRE to a class of Bertrand games that includes our main application (although this is implicit in their setup). More exactly, their price c is our pricep, and they study symmetric QRE for probabilistic price setting on the interval [p, p mon ] (in our notation), while we allow for beliefs that assign positive probability also to prices belowp. Assuming that the noise terms have a power distribution, they show the existence of a symmetric QRE for each parameter value λ > 0 (in their notation), where a higher λ means that the random choice comes closer (in probability) to a best reply. As λ → +∞, the probability mass moves towards a unit point mass at the price c =p, that is, the same price that we show is robust under strategic uncertainty. By contrast, we do not assume symmetry. Instead, we derive both symmetry and uniqueness, and also show thatp is in fact strictly robust, that is, robust for a wide range of probabilistic beliefs about other's strategy choices. Although our result agrees with their limit result in those games, Example 6 shows that this agreement is not general. Indeed, the unique logistic QRE (that is, with Gumbel distributed noise terms) in that example converges, as λ → +∞, to a limit distribution with E [s 1 ] = 1/2 and E [s 2 ] = 1, a weakly 20 dominated Nash equilibrium in the unperturbed game.
14 By contrast, the unique undominated Nash equilibrium in this game, (1, 1) , is the unique robust equilibrium.
Some other selection criteria for Bertrand competition have been proposed in the literature. Spulber (1995) assumes that firms are uncertain about rivals' costs and shows that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. As the number of firms grows, equilibrium pricing strategies tend to average cost pricing, which is clearly at variance with our prediction. Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004) show that, in Bertrand games with convex costs, there exists a unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (in the sense of Bernheim et al., 1987) , which converges to the competitive outcome under free entry, again a different prediction from ours, which does not depend on the number of firms.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a way to model strategic uncertainty in a straightforward fashion. After defining a robustness criterion, we investigated in detail the Bertrand competition game, which has discontinuous payoffs and continuum action spaces. We then went on to deriving a handful of general results for games with continuous payoffs. In the Bertrand competition game with convex costs, we showed that our notion of robustness to strategic uncertainty selects a unique Nash equilibrium, that, moreover, figured prominently in recent laboratory experiments.
Our criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty comes at a relatively low analytical cost and we believe it has a wide domain of application. Indeed, in an earlier working paper (Andersson, Argenton and Weibull, 2010) we also consider the Nash demand game, and we show that robustness to symmetric strategic uncertainty singles out the Nash bargaining solution. For the case with asymmetric strategic uncertainty we find that the party who is least uncertain about the other party's bid obtains the bigger share. To name further examples that are yet to be explored, mechanisms for the provision of discrete public goods à la Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) are games with continuum action-spaces and discontinuous payoffs, admitting multiple equilibria. We think it would be worthwhile to apply our robustness criterion to such games and to check it against the experimental literature.
As mentioned earlier, our approach is agnostic regarding the source of the beliefs. However, there are several straightforward extensions involving arguably natural restrictions on beliefs. For instance, while we allow beliefs to attach positive probabilities to others' strategies that are (strictly or weakly) dominated or non-rationalizable, the notion of t-equilibrium -and hence robustness to strategic uncertainty -can be weakened by imposing requirements that the support of beliefs be restricted to others' undominated or rationalizable strategies.
